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bridged this gap with policy initiatives that go
beyond a narrow reading of their mandate, but
they could do so only to a limited extent that
has not been sufficient to stop the contagion.
• Fourth, a successful crisis resolution will need
to include at least four components at the
European level, in addition to steps to be taken
by individual countries: (a) fiscal federalism, ie
mechanisms that ensure that fiscal policies in
the euro area are partly centralised with shared
backing across countries so as to meet the
requirements of monetary union; (b) banking
federalism, ie a framework for banking policy
at the European level that credibly supports the
vision of a single European market for financial
services; (c) an overhaul of EU / euro-area
institutions that would enable fiscal and
banking federalism to be sustainable, by
allowing centralised executive decision-making
to the extent necessary and by guaranteeing
democratic accountability; and (d) short-term
arrangements that chart a path towards the
completion of the previous three points, which
is bound to take some time. These should
involve expanded instruments to intervene in
the banking sector and to provide interim
funding to struggling euro-area governments,
taking into account the possibility of insolvent
member states having to undergo debt
restructuring.
• Fifth, these requirements for crisis resolution
cannot be met unless political conditions
change sharply in their favour. This leaves the
US exposed to a risk of financial contagion,
which it can partly mitigate with adequate
contingency planning and proportionate
precautionary measures. The US can and
should also continue to play a constructive role
by providing advice to its European partners,
and thus helping them rise to the momentous
challenges they face. However, only the
THE EUROPEAN CRISIS is entering a critical phase
because policy initiatives undertaken so far have
not prevented systemic contagion. I will concen-
trate my remarks on the role of Europe’s banking
system in the crisis, the steps needed at the Euro-
pean level for the crisis to be resolved, and the
short-term outlook.  The key points of my state-
ment are the following:
• First, Europe’s banking system has been in a
continuous stage of systemic fragility since
2007-08, in contrast with the United States
where banking crisis resolution was swifter
and was essentially completed in 2009. The
inability of European policymakers to resolve
their banking crisis so far can be explained by
deeply-embedded features of their respective
countries’ financial systems and political
economy structures. 
• Second, the current phase, which is often
described as a sovereign debt crisis, is really a
sequence of interactions between sovereign
problems and banking problems. Had western
Europe’s banks been in a better shape a year
and a half ago, the policy approach to the Greek
debt crisis would have been entirely different,
possibly allowing for a much earlier sovereign
debt restructuring. So the situation is best
described as twin sovereign and banking crises
that mutually feed each other. The result of this
interaction is a gradual contagion to more
countries and more asset classes.
• Third, the crisis has exposed a major deficit of
executive decision-making capability in the EU
and euro-area institutional framework, which
helps to explain the insufficient policy
response. It can thus be said that the banking
and sovereign crises are compounded by a
crisis of the EU institutions themselves.
Specialised European bodies, primarily the
European Central Bank (ECB), have partly
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Europeans themselves can solve their current
predicament.
These remarks should not be taken as unduly
pessimistic. In the US public debate, one
frequently hears the euro area described as an
inherently unsustainable experiment, and
European nations as incapable of reform. Such
dark depictions of the European situation are
unhelpful and misleading. European monetary
union is certainly an experiment, but it is not
doomed to fail: euro-area countries have shown
and are showing an extraordinary degree of
political commitment to perpetuate their currency
union. They have already taken very significant
institutional steps towards more centralised
economic and financial management since the
beginning of the crisis, and are gradually
accepting the need for further steps, even though
the process is not as swift as external observers
might wish. Most euro-area periphery countries
have taken very serious and painful initiatives to
reform and place themselves back on a
sustainable economic track. And elections in
many European countries since the start of the
crisis have shown that the vast majority of
citizens resist the temptation of populism and are
willing to embrace the needed adjustment
policies.
I believe that the integrity of the euro area will be
defended in this crisis and that the EU will
eventually emerge with a stronger, more resilient
economic and financial policy framework. But the
road will be very bumpy, and Europeans will pay
a high economic price for the inadequacies of their
collective decision-making processes.
The rest of this statement expands on these points
and provides additional background.
Europe’s banking crisis
Europe has been in a continuous state of systemic
banking fragility since August 2007. This puts it
in contrast with the US where the phase of
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‘Europe has been in a continuous state of systemic banking fragility since August 2007. This
contrasts with the US, where the systemic banking crisis phase ended in 2009, even though the
broader economic crisis continues to cast a shadow on America’s long-term fiscal outlook.’
systemic banking crisis ended in 2009, even
though the broader economic crisis has proved
difficult to address and casts a shadow on
America’s long-term fiscal outlook. One indication
of Europe’s prolonged state of fragility is that the
ECB’s extraordinary liquidity support to euro-area
banks (in the ECB’s parlance, fixed-rate full
allotment in refinancing operations), introduced
in October 2008, remains in place to this day. By
contrast, the closest comparable programme on
the US side, the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction
Facility, was gradually phased out and expired in
March 2010. Similarly, in October 2008 the
European Commission’s Directorate-General for
Competition Policy (DG COMP) made its
enforcement practices on the control of state aid
to the banking sector more flexible on the basis of
Article 87.3b of the European Community Treaty,
which allows for aid “to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a member state”.
This adaptation of competition policy to crisis
times has been continuously in place since then,
and European Commissioner for Competition
Policy Joaquin Almunia recently announced that it
would remain so until early 2012 at least.
In comparison with the US, the European banking
sector has until now gone only through modest
restructuring as a consequence of the crisis,
particularly in the euro area. Among major
European financial institutions, only Halifax Bank
of Scotland (HBOS) in the United Kingdom and
Fortis in the Benelux countries were dismantled
or forcibly merged into competitors at the height
of the crisis, in comparison to Countrywide
Financial, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
American International Group, Washington Mutual,
Wachovia and Merrill Lynch which were merged or
restructured in the United States. Moreover, the US
bank receivership process administered by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation meant that
a significant number of small-and medium-sized
banks (and some large ones, such as Washington
Mutual) were allowed to fail. In Europe, where
most countries did not have an orderly resolution
process for depository institutions in 2008-09,
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senior creditors were made whole in almost all
cases of individual bank problems, and so were
junior creditors in the vast majority of cases.
In the spring of 2009, the US Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (commonly known as
‘stress tests’) identified ten of the country’s 19
largest financial institutions as undercapitalised,
and the subsequent wave of capital strengthening
helped investors regain trust in the institutions at
the core of the US financial system, even as
smaller banks continued to fail in large numbers
in 2009 and 2010. In the EU, no similar process
of triage and recapitalisation was conducted in
time to restore confidence. A first round of
European stress tests in September 2009 had
negligible market impact as only aggregate
numbers, not bank-by-bank results, were
published. A second round of stress tests led to
the publication of bank-by-bank results for 91
financial institutions across the EU in July 2010,
but the disclosures lacked specificity and
comparability, and some institutions that had
passed the tests, such as Allied Irish Banks, were
exposed as severely undercapitalised shortly
afterwards. A third round of stress tests led to
better disclosures in July 2011, but identified only
limited recapitalisation needs.
The European reluctance to accept bank failures
and banking sector restructuring can be traced to
various factors. To start with, banks are
comparatively much larger in Europe than they are
in America, compared with the size of national
economies and even after the consolidation that
the crisis has induced on the US side. According to
the Bank for International Settlements, in 2009,
the aggregated assets of the top three banks
represented 406 percent of GDP in the
Netherlands, 336 percent in the UK, 334 percent
in Sweden, 250 percent in France, 189 percent in
Spain, 121 percent in Italy, and 118 percent in
Germany, compared with 92 percent in Japan and
‘only’ 43 percent in the US. This is due to a
combination of two main factors. First, banks
generally play a larger role of financial
intermediation in Europe than in the US, where
non-bank financial intermediaries and capital
markets provide a larger share of total capital and
credit. And second, many European banks have
aggressively expanded internationally, thus
increasing the scope of activities that, to the
extent that these banks aren’t allowed to fail, are
implicitly supported by taxpayers in the home
country. On average, the largest European banks
have 57 percent of their activity outside of their
home country (in the rest of Europe and in the rest
of the world in about equal proportions), while the
average ratio is only 22 percent among a
comparable sample of the largest US banks.
Moreover, there is a high degree of interdepend-
ence between banking systems and policymak-
ing systems in most western European countries.
This interdependence also exists in the US, and its
specific forms vary widely from one country to
another. In Germany, many locally elected officials
sit on the boards of local public banks, an activity
from which they typically derive a significant part
of their personal income; publicly-owned banks at
regional (Land) and sub-regional levels are often
used as tools for local economic-development
policy. In Spain, a similar situation used to exist
with the local savings banks (Cajas), even though
this is now changing as many Cajas are being
merged and restructured under compulsion from
the central government. In Italy, non-profit foun-
dations with strong links with local political estab-
lishments are key shareholders in most prominent
financial institutions. In France, the regional com-
ponent is perhaps less strong but at the national
level, financial policymakers and bank executives
tend to come from the same small pool of senior
civil servants, and it is common practice for the
former to switch to a high-level bank position at
mid-career. In all these countries and elsewhere
in Europe, this interdependence is a significant
factor in the national political economy.
Moreover, the protection granted by national gov-
ernments to their ‘home’ banks does not have to
be a function of cozy links between public and pri-
vate-sector elites, as there is also a strong com-
ponent of economic nationalism at play. In most
euro-area countries, banks are frequently seen as
national or local ‘champions’ whose prosperity is
presumed to be broadly aligned with the national
interest – even where this presumption does not
rest on specific, compelling evidence. Resistance
to cross-border bank takeovers remains deeply
entrenched particularly in France, Italy and Spain
but also in parts of northern Europe – even though
TESTIMONY ON THE EUROPEAN DEBT AND FINANCIAL CRISIS Nicolas Véron
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the ongoing restructuring of the Spanish banking
sector might eventually result in a change in atti-
tudes there. The same factors help explain why
national policymaking communities are often in
collective denial of the moral hazard created by
the too-big-to-fail problem, as well as in denial of
the conflicts of interest that are potentially
embedded in the universal bank model which
combines retail banking, investment banking,
plus in many cases asset management, insurance
activities, and proprietary investment within
diversified financial conglomerates. In many con-
tinental European countries, supervisory authori-
ties harbour a culture that favours keeping
sensitive information tight between themselves
and the supervised entities, and are thus inclined
to resist calls for public disclosures about finan-
cial risks and exposures, as was illustrated by
controversies around the successive rounds of
European stress tests.
Banking crisis and sovereign crisis
The financial crisis spilled over into a sovereign
crisis in the euro area in early 2010. A year before,
in the first months of 2009, the tense situation of
several central and eastern European countries
had raised widespread market concerns, but was
subsequently stabilised thanks to energetic
efforts of economic reform and budget tightening,
most remarkably in the Baltic countries, and to
successful international coordination in the form
of the so-called Vienna Initiative to maintain
liquidity to local banking systems. The euro-area
sovereign crisis started when the government of
Greece, freshly elected in October 2009, revealed
that its predecessor had misled its euro-area
neighbours and the public about the true state of
the country’s public finances. The ensuing
deterioration of Greece’s access to capital markets
led it to seek help from fellow euro-area countries
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
resulting in the May 2010 announcement of a first
conditional assistance package of €110 billion,
quickly followed by the decision to set up a
European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF)
with €440 billion in financial firepower to
intervene in similar situations. Simultaneously,
the ECB initiated a ‘Securities Markets Programme’
under which it buys sovereign debt of troubled
countries in secondary markets. Subsequently,
the EFSF and IMF jointly agreed to provide
conditional assistance packages to Ireland
(November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011), and
in July 2011, further assistance to Greece was
decided by the euro-area heads of state and
government.
The interdependence between sovereign credit
and banking systems has been a running theme
of this sequence of events. Euro-area sovereign
debt assets are held in large amounts by euro-
area banks, with a significant bias for the bonds
of the country in which the bank is headquartered
but also significant cross-border exposures to
other euro-area countries’ sovereign debt. This is
partly due to policy choices before the crisis which
in retrospect appear questionable, particularly the
risk-weighting at zero of euro-area sovereign
bonds in regulatory capital calculations, the long
standing acceptance of such bonds with no
haircut by the ECB as collateral in its liquidity
policies, and possible instances of moral suasion
by home-country public authorities that resulted
in large holdings of the home country’s sovereign
debt. In early 2010, the concern about the
possible financial stability consequences for
banks in France, Germany and other countries of
having to book losses in the event of a Greek debt
restructuring was a significant motivation for the
decision to provide financial assistance to Athens.
Even though it is impossible to know
counterfactuals, had the western European
banking sector been less fragile at that time, it is
very possible that a different course would have
been taken involving Greek debt restructuring as
early as 2010, and everything afterwards would
have developed very differently. Put bluntly, the
moral hazard created by the Greek package is
largely a consequence of the failure or
unwillingness of European policymakers to
resolve the European banking crisis in 2009.
‘In many European countries, supervisory authorities harbour a culture of keeping sensitive
information tight between themselves and the supervised entities, and thus are inclined to
resist calls for public disclosures about financial risks and exposures.’
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Similarly, the perceived fragility of continental
European banks is the main reason why the Irish
government was not allowed to impose losses on
holders of senior bonds issued by the country’s
banks, including the collapsed Anglo Irish Bank, in
the discussion of the November 2010 assistance
package provided by the IMF and the EFSF, with a
strong involvement of the ECB in the negotiation
of that package. This condition correspondingly
increased the burden of fiscal adjustment for
Ireland and remains to this day a matter of
controversy in the Irish political environment.
Conversely, deterioration of sovereign debt
prospects in Greece, Portugal, and Italy has had a
knock-on negative effect on their domestic
banking systems, given local banks’ high levels of
home-country sovereign debt exposure, as well as
on French banks which hold large portfolios of
sovereign debt from the euro-area’s periphery
countries.
In the latest step to date, a relatively mild debt
restructuring scheme euphemistically known as
‘private sector involvement’ (PSI) was made a
condition for the new assistance package to
Greece whose outline was announced on 21 July
2011, largely because of domestic political factors
in countries including Germany and the
Netherlands. However, the continued banking
fragility led leaders to go for a 'voluntary' form of
PSI that would only entail moderate impairment of
the affected assets. This arguably results in the
worst of both worlds for Greece and the euro area:
a further deterioration of Greece creditworthiness
(PSI being considered ‘selective default’ by the
main credit rating agencies) and contagion to
other euro-area countries, in spite of solemn
declarations that the Greek case is unique and
would not be used as a template for other country
situations; and simultaneously, a reduction of the
Greek debt burden that is too limited to
significantly improve its debt dynamics.
The interconnectedness between the banking and
the sovereign crises helps to explain the lack of
consensus about the current capital strength of
Europe’s banks. The official position of EU
authorities and all euro-area governments
remains that, with the possible exception of
Greece, euro-area countries are not going to
default on their sovereign obligations. Under this
assumption, the current depressed market prices
of periphery countries’ debt need not be reflected
on the balance sheets of banks with large held-to-
maturity portfolios of such debt, and the European
banking sector would appear adequately
capitalised as a whole. If, however, market signals
are taken at face value, or simply if a prudential
approach is applied that compels banks with high
exposures to periphery sovereigns to hold
sizeable additional capital buffers, the average
level of capital strength appears seriously
insufficient. Thus, the solvency assessment of
Europe’s banks crucially depends on the view one
has of the seriousness of the sovereign crisis. The
rapidity of contagion, which extended to Italy in
July and to French banks in August, suggests a
conservative attitude is warranted, as the IMF is
also arguing in its latest Global Financial Stability
Report.
A crisis of EU institutions
This sequence of events highlights that European
policymakers missed an important opportunity
when they neglected to address their banking
sector’s fragility decisively when market
conditions were relatively favourable in 2009,
especially after the success of the US Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program. This failure is not for
lack of good advice: the IMF, among others, had
emphasised this challenge in its policy
recommendations to European leaders. Had this
advice been taken, and had Greek debt been
adequately restructured in the first half of 2010,
we would probably not have a major systemic
crisis in Europe.
In decisions taken after May 2010, and until now,
European leaders have often appeared to be
behind the curve, and to react to the crisis’s
previous stage rather than to the current one. The
‘The solvency assessment of Europe’s banks crucially depends on the view one has of the
seriousness of the sovereign crisis. The rapidity of contagion, which has extended to Italy and to
French banks, suggests a conservative attitude is warranted, as the IMF is also arguing.’
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European Commission, with the significant
exception of DG COMP, has not been able to make
executive decisions that it could impose on
individual market participants. Its Directorate-
General for the Internal Market and Services has
focused on drafting new financial legislation but
has devoted limited resources to its core mission
of enforcing the integrity of the single market for
financial services. Its Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs has provided
valuable economic analysis, but so far has not
presented a blueprint for crisis management
instruments that would bring the situation under
control.
The Commission’s President, José Manuel Barroso,
has been very successful and proactive on one
important occasion, when he commissioned a
report from a blue-ribbon group led by former
French central banker Jacques de Larosière, which
resulted in a major overhaul of the EU’s
supervisory architecture (see below). But in
terms of crisis management, the Commission has
generally not been able to get ahead of events,
partly because of its limited de facto decision-
making autonomy vis-à-vis member states (apart
from DG COMP, which enjoys special status). This
has left much of the action in the hands of the
Council, ie the group formed by relevant
representatives of the individual member states’
governments, who, being accountable as they are
to their respective national constituencies, have
found it difficult to overcome their differences.
This is better analysed as a failure of institutions
than of individual leaders. A different set of
political leaders might have done better, but the
core problem has been the insufficient political
mandate of the Commission (and of the
permanent president of the Council since the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in January
2010, Herman Van Rompuy), combined with the
misalignment between the incentives of
individual countries’ leaders and the collective
European interest. This combination works more
or less satisfactorily in ordinary times, but its
shortcomings become much more apparent in a
crisis environment as it does not allow for
effective executive decision-making at the EU
level. The ‘French-German couple’ is occasionally
presented as a pragmatic option to bridge the
executive leadership gap, but its accountability
and legitimacy have been insufficient to provide
the required impetus.
In the course of the crisis, individual EU bodies
have occasionally found it possible to bridge part
of the executive leadership gap. This has been
most obviously the case of the ECB, particularly
since May 2010 with the Securities Markets
Programme of buying sovereign bonds from
selected euro-area countries on the secondary
markets. However, the extent to which the ECB can
go further on this path is not unconstrained,
because it is seen by a number of constituents
(notably in Germany) as a dangerous intrusion
into fiscal policy that is bound to compromise the
ECB’s independence and its integrity in delivering
on its core mission of ensuring price stability.
Similarly though less prominently, since 2008 DG
COMP has leveraged its authority to examine state
aid by individual member states to individual
financial institutions to press for more aggressive
recapitalisation of the weaker links in Europe’s
banking system, but its mandate has not allowed
it to embark on a system-wide approach.
As mentioned, a high-level group led by Jacques
de Larosière was formed in late 2008 at the
initiative of the European Commission’s President,
and in February 2009 this group recommended
the creation of three European Supervisory
Authorities to help oversee Europe’s financial
sector from a pan-European perspective –
respectively, the European Banking Authority
(EBA) based in London, the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA) based in Paris, and
the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) based in Frankfurt.
These supervisory authorities were
complemented by the creation of a European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to coordinate macro-
‘A different set of political leaders in Europe might have done better, but the core problem has
been the insufficient political mandate of the Commission combined with the misalignment
between the incentives of individual countries’ leaders and the collective European interest.’
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prudential policy. The corresponding EU legislation
was (by EU standards) swiftly approved and the
new institutions officially started operations on 1
January 2011. Even though it is still early to form
a judgement, the EBA has had a material impact in
making the disclosures accompanying the July
2011 stress tests markedly more reliable than
had been the case in the previous round a year
earlier. Thus, it can be hoped that these new
agencies can bridge part of the leadership gap in
the future as they gather institutional strength.
However, as with the ECB and DG COMP, their
mandate is limited and cannot be overextended to
matters that entail major dimensions of political
legitimacy and accountability.
The European Parliament has been gaining
competencies in successive revisions of the
European treaties, and is now an important player
in shaping legislation. However, its oversight
powers on the EU institutions, especially the
Council, remain restricted in comparison to most
national parliaments. Moreover, the European
Parliament, unlike lower houses in democratic
regimes, is not elected on the basis of electoral
constituencies of about-equal demographic
weight, as smaller EU member states elect more
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) than
larger ones in proportion to their population. These
shortcomings have led Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court, in a landmark ruling in June
2009, to find the EU institutions not democratic
enough to be granted powers in key areas of
sovereignty, including fiscal policy.
In the words of the Court, “With the present status
of integration, the European Union does, even
upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,
not yet attain a shape that corresponds to the level
of legitimisation of a democracy constituted as a
state. (...) Neither as regards its composition nor
its position in the European competence structure
is the European Parliament sufficiently prepared
to take representative and assignable majority
decisions as uniform decisions on political direc-
tion. Measured against requirements placed on
democracy in states, its election does not take due
account of equality, and it is not competent to take
authoritative decisions on political direction in the
context of the supranational balancing of interest
between the states. It therefore cannot support a
parliamentary government and organise itself
with regard to party politics in the system of gov-
ernment and opposition in such a way that a deci-
sion on political direction taken by the European
electorate could have a politically decisive effect".
This ‘structural democratic deficit’ (also in the
words of the Court) is a fundamental impediment
to building up an effective executive capability at
the EU level.
Conditions for crisis resolution
The design flaws of the euro area, including the
lack of a federal fiscal and banking policy
framework and the democratic deficit of EU
institutions, had been well identified by analysts
at the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed in
1991. However, this did not prevent the euro from
being introduced in 1999 and from having what
can fairly be described as a highly successful first
decade, ostensibly disproving its doubters’
warnings. Similarly, the same shortcomings need
not be fatal now if individual member states
succeed in bringing their sovereign finances, their
banking systems and their economies back on a
sustainable track. However, the unfavourable
global economic environment and loss of investor
confidence during the sequence of events so far
make it unlikely that the crisis can be overcome
without meaningful progress in addressing
fundamental weaknesses in the European
institutional framework.
Structural reforms that favour entrepreneurship
and enhance the economy’s growth potential,
fiscal adjustment, and bank restructuring are
required at the level of individual member states.
They are an indispensable dimension of any
successful crisis resolution. They vary from one
country to another and their elaboration would
require detail beyond the scope of this testimony.
At the European level, the necessary steps can be
(rather simplistically) summarised into four
components: (a) a consistent federal euro-area
framework for fiscal policy (fiscal federalism); (b)
a consistent federal euro area / EU framework for
banking policy (banking federalism); (c) a general
overhaul of the EU’s political institutions that
would upgrade their executive decision-making
capability; and (d) adequate short-term crisis
management arrangements to bridge the time gap
TESTIMONY ON THE EUROPEAN DEBT AND FINANCIAL CRISIS Nicolas Véron
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between the present turmoil and an ultimate
crisis resolution that would include the previous
three components.
The first component, fiscal federalism, already
exists in Europe in indirect forms, including the
borrowing capacity of the European Commission
and the European Investment Bank (which are
however tightly limited) and the collateral policy
of the ECB, which allows it to take risks with an
ultimate guarantee from member states. A further
tentative step was taken in the direction of
building a euro-area fiscal federation with the
creation of the EFSF, even though its design is
strictly intergovernmental, and the decision to
provide loans to struggling euro-area countries at
below-market rates. However, none of this
prevents the possibility of fiscal or economic
mismanagement or financial shocks in individual
member states putting the stability of the entire
monetary union at risk, as is now the case.
A vivid debate in Europe centres on the possible
practical form of such fiscal federalism. One much-
discussed proposal, by my Bruegel colleagues
Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker, would
have euro area members pool debt issuance up to
60 percent of their respective GDP in the form of
euro area-wide ‘blue bonds’, and meet any
additional funding needs through higher-yielding
‘red bonds’ that would instill market discipline at
the level of individual countries1. Another option,
typically referred to as ‘Eurobonds’, would be to
federalise all sovereign borrowing in the euro area
under a joint and several guarantee from all euro-
area countries. A more limited approach, first
suggested by Daniel Gros at the Centre for
European Policy Studies and Thomas Mayer at
Deutsche Bank, would be to allow the EFSF to
leverage its current resources and vastly expand
its lending capacity by allowing it to borrow from
the ECB. All these proposals imply new
mechanisms to discipline the economic policy
behaviour of individual member states and
mitigate the moral hazard inherent in any pooled
borrowing scheme.
In a landmark speech in Aachen on 2 June 2011,
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet outlined what
he sees as the necessary next steps: in a first
step, “in the medium term”, giving the European
Council, on the basis of a proposal by the
European Commission and in liaison with the ECB,
the right to veto national economic policy
decisions that may be harmful to euro area
stability; and in a second step, “in the historical
long term”, establishing a European ‘ministry of
finance’ that would exert ongoing surveillance of
both fiscal policies and competitiveness policies,
that could take over direct responsibility for
economic policy in failing countries, and that
would also exert responsibilities in financial sector
policy and external representation. Even though
he did not specify how this intrusive authority
could be legitimised from a political standpoint,
this vision emphasises the need for executive
decision making capacity at the core of the future
fiscal federal framework, as not all future policy
challenges can be captured in a set of ex-ante
rules and automatic sanctions, no matter how well
designed.
The second component of eventual crisis
resolution, banking federalism, also exists in
embryonic form in the EU, with a largely though
not completely harmonised banking regulatory
framework in the form of EU financial legislation,
and the recently created EBA which was endowed
with limited supervisory and crisis management
competencies. Even so, however, most
supervisory and resolution authority still rests
with member states, and so does a still significant
amount of rule making that affects financial
institutions, on conduct of business and
consumer protection but also on prudential
aspects as is illustrated by the current debate
about the recommendations of the Independent
Commission on Banking (or Vickers Commission)
in the United Kingdom. Member states provide the
guarantee for deposits, even though the
modalities are harmonised under EU legislation,
and only the member states have the fiscal
capacity to intervene with equity or capital-like
instruments in a crisis situation (even though
liquidity policy in the euro area is mainly
conducted by the ECB, and the ECB also has a say
over additional liquidity assistance that may be
provided by the euro-area’s national central banks
beyond its own operations).
A European banking policy framework would imply
the consistent formulation and implementation of
1. Jacques Delpla and
Jakob von Weizsäcker
(2010) 'The Blue Bond pro-
posal', Policy Brief
2010/03, Bruegel.
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regulatory, supervisory, resolution, deposit
guarantee, and competition policies with regard
to the banking industry throughout the EU.
Compared with the present situation, this would
entail at least four steps:
• The EBA should be granted supervisory
authority over all credit institutions in the EU,
which it would exercise either directly
(specifically, over the central operations of
banks with a pan-European scope) or indirectly
(by delegating it back to national agencies,
over banks that are only active in one country,
or over local operations of pan-European
banks); 
• The EBA’s own governance should be over-
hauled so as to ensure its decision-making is
better aligned with the European public inter-
est (the current decision framework involves
single-majority voting by representatives of the
27 EU member states, which can lead to mas-
sively skewed outcomes because of the dis-
proportionate influence of smaller countries); 
• The EFSF should provide an explicit guarantee
of national deposit guarantee schemes in all
countries in the euro area, in order to prevent
bank runs in the event of national sovereign-
debt difficulties; 
• Existing processes that allow member states
to block cross-border acquisitions of 'their'
banks should be dismantled or brought under
the control of European authorities. 
The combination of these measures would have
the effect of ‘decoupling’ the banks from their
national governments, putting an end to the single
major impediment to the formation of a genuine
European banking system, as opposed to a
collection of national ones, as an indispensable
complement to monetary unification. These
proposals are broadly similar to the ones outlined
by the IMF’s then managing director Dominique
Strauss-Kahn in a speech in Brussels on 19 March
20102.
The third component of crisis resolution is the
upgrading of EU institutions, to enable them to
support the federal frameworks for fiscal policy
and banking policy in a politically sustainable
manner. Essentially, this means bridging the cur-
rent democratic deficit to a sufficient extent that
executive decisions can be legitimately taken in
these policy areas at the European level and not
only at the national one. This cannot be achieved
without significant changes in the EU treaties. One
aspect has to be the correction of the design flaws
identified by Germany’s Federal Constitutional
Court in its above-quoted 2009 ruling, namely the
redefinition of the European Parliament’s electoral
constituencies in order to ensure equal represen-
tation of EU citizens, and enhanced oversight
powers for the European Parliament over the exec-
utive and budget functions of EU institutions.
Whether these measures would be sufficient to
close the democratic gap is debatable, and would
obviously warrant further public deliberation.
One additional layer of complexity is the tension
between the euro-area perimeter and that of the
EU as a whole. At this point, the euro area
comprises 17 of the EU’s 27 member states, the
outliers being the UK, Sweden, Denmark, and
seven central and eastern European countries
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, and Romania). Some of these
countries may move towards joining the euro area
assuming that the current phase of turmoil is
overcome, but this does not seem to be a likely
prospect for the United Kingdom, and perhaps
others. How the EU institutional framework can
cohabit with what UK Chancellor of the Exchequer
George Osborne has memorably termed “the
remorseless logic of monetary union that leads
from a single currency to greater fiscal
integration” among euro-area countries remains
an open question. This is particularly true in the
area of banking policy, which is currently set at
the EU rather than euro-area level, a fact that is
reflected in the location of the European Banking
Authority in London. This tension may become
increasingly prominent in the years ahead.
Finally, the fourth necessary component of crisis
resolution is to manage the transition from now to
the completion of a federal fiscal and banking
policy framework under reformed EU institutions,
which, even under extreme assumptions, is bound
to take an extended period of time, measured in
years rather than months, to achieve. By
definition, these transition arrangements
represent a more short-term concern that needs
to be addressed within the existing Treaty
2. Available at
http://www.imf.org/exte
rnal/np/speeches/2010
/031910.htm
(accessed 22 Septem-
ber 2011).
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framework. Here too, in addition to action at the
level of individual member states, the twin issues
of banking crisis and sovereign crisis need to be
addressed.
A central role could be played by an instrument to
be created on an explicitly temporary basis,
analogous to the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) that brought about the resolution of the US
savings and loan crisis in 1989-90. More than two
years ago, in June 2009, Bruegel and the Peterson
Institute published an analysis in which Adam
Posen, now on the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England, and I suggested a blueprint
for such a European RTC, or as we termed it with
reference to a German precedent a ‘European
Banking Treuhand’3. The role of this ad-hoc entity
would be to catalyse and steer the necessary
restructuring and cross-border consolidation of
Europe’s banking sector, by identifying which
institutions are undercapitalised on a consistent
basis across national borders, by taking over and
restructuring those that cannot find enough
capital from arm’s-length sources, and by
managing the corresponding assets and reselling
them when market conditions allow. In the context
of the sovereign crisis, this trust corporation could
play an additional stabilising role by ensuring the
orderly functioning of the banking system in
countries which undergo a sovereign debt
restructuring. To fulfil its role, it would require
enabling legislation passed in emergency by all
relevant member states.
With a proper framework in place to manage
banking emergencies on a consistent, system-
wide basis, the euro area could envisage energetic
debt restructuring in member states that cannot
meet their obligations, which I believe to be the
case for Greece alone at this point. This would
send shockwaves through the system but would
also contribute to a reduction of uncertainty. It
would need to be backed by enhanced liquidity
assistance to other member states. The most
likely option for this in the short term is expanded
intervention by the ECB, possibly through the
agency of a leveraged EFSF that would be granted
access to ECB liquidity. This appears to be what
was recommended by US Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner in his conversations with his
European colleagues last week. It is also the short-
term solution that emerged from a collective
simulation exercise jointly hosted by the Peterson
Institute and Bruegel last week, on which my
colleagues Guntram Wolff at Bruegel and Ted
Truman at the Peterson Institute have reported on
the two organisation’s respective websites4. Our
simulation suggests that this could be compatible
with the ECB’s mandate under the existing Treaty
and that it could have a material impact in
addressing market contagion.
Short-term outlook and policy options for the US
Spelling out these conditions for crisis resolutions
underlines the Herculean political challenges of
their implementation. Treaty changes that involve
multiple referendums and also likely amendments
to national constitutions, including in Germany;
the shift of core areas of sovereignty from the
national to the EU level; the definition of a modus
vivendi with non-euro area members within EU
institutions whose functioning would become
dominated by euro area-only processes; and,
inevitably, the public acknowledgement of major
policy failures in the treatment of the crisis so far.
At this point, it appears very difficult to identify a
reliable path from here to there, and the short-term
outlook is not the most encouraging. Things are
likely to get worse in Europe before they can get
better. In the current circumstances too many
European citizens, and too many of their leaders,
remain in denial of their collective predicament,
which prevents necessary initiatives from being
undertaken. This means that contagion may
spread further in the very short term.
This, however, remains a crisis for the Europeans
to resolve. Europe’s international partners can
help, but cannot take their place to fix the
situation. The euro area as a whole is not in a state
‘The short-term outlook in Europe is not encouraging. Things are likely to get worse before they
can get better. Too many European citizens, and too many of their leaders, remain in denial of
their collective predicament, which prevents necessary initiatives from being undertaken.’
3. Adam Posen and Nicolas
Véron (2009) 'A solution for
Europe's banking problem',
Policy Brief 2009/03,
Bruegel.
4. Conference on Resolving
the European debt crisis,
13-14 September 2011,
summary available at
http://www.bruegel.org/pub
lications/publication-
detail/publication/606-
resolving-the-european-deb
t-crisis/ (accessed 22 Sep-
tember 2011).
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of financial distress. Its aggregate debt and deficit
metrics compare favourably to the US, UK or
Japan.
The IMF has played a very constructive role since
the beginning of the crisis. Beyond the financial
assistance it has provided to Greece, Ireland and
Portugal, it has brought invaluable experience and
technical input to the discussion among
Europeans. The US government, together with
other non-European countries, has provided
pointed advice at critical moments. But none of
these external partners of Europe can unlock the
key bottlenecks in the current phase, which are
primarily political in nature.
Financial contagion to the US from further
deterioration in the euro area cannot be ruled out.
In spite of the recent downgrading by Standard
and Poor’s, US sovereign debt retains safe haven
status and I do not expect this to change in the
short term, including in the case that things would
take a sharp negative turn in Europe. However,
because of multiple financial interdependencies
across the Atlantic, deterioration in Europe could
have financial impact in the US. These
transatlantic contagion risks can be mitigated to
an extent by appropriate contingency planning
and enhanced dialogue between financial
supervisory authorities in the US, on the one hand,
and the US arms of European financial firms, as
well as US financial firms with financial exposure
to Europe, on the other hand. Under the current
circumstances, the US should not overreact and
financially ring-fence itself from the rest of the
world to an extent that would compromise global
financial integration from which the US is one of
the key beneficiaries. Thus, precautionary
measures are warranted but should remain
proportionate. This seems to be the current
mindset of US financial authorities.
The Federal Reserve is also participating, together
with others of the world’s prominent central banks,
in a network of currency swaps with the ECB that
facilitates the access of euro-area banks to
liquidity in dollars and other non-euro currencies.
The benefits of this initiative in terms of financial
stability, at the global level and also from the strict
domestic point of view of the US, appear to vastly
exceed the risks involved to the Federal Reserve.
The US, the IMF and others global partners have an
important role to play by providing advice and
what John Maynard Keynes called ruthless truth-
telling to their European partners. Many
Europeans still find it difficult to acknowledge the
extreme seriousness of the current conditions in
the euro area. Expressing concern in constructive
but frank terms can help, as Secretary Geithner
apparently did in a mid-September visit to Poland5.
But, once again, only the Europeans themselves
can meaningfully address their current,
dangerous situation.
5. For further information
and an analysis of this
see Guntram B. Wolff
(2011) Why we should
listen to Tim Geithner,
available at http://www.
bruegel.org/publications
/publication-detail/
publication/608-why-
we-should-listen-to
-tim-geithner/
(accessed 22
September 2011).
